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Abstract 
 
Meristo, M. (2007). Mental Representation and Language Access: Evidence from Deaf 
Children with Different Language Backgrounds. Department of Psychology, Göteborg 
University, Sweden. 
 
The present work investigated the relationship between mentalizing skills on the one hand and 
different language experiences and cognitive characteristics on the other hand. The aim of 
study I was to determine whether access to sign language as the medium of instruction in 
school influences mentalizing abilities among deaf children. The deaf children recruited either 
grew up in deaf or hearing families. Some of the children attended a school following the 
oralist method, another group of children attended a school with a bilingual approach. In study 
II the effects of working memory skills on the relation between language of instruction and 
understanding false-belief were examined. Study III aimed at testing if differences in 
mentalizing skills between different groups of deaf children, as reported previously, were 
mirrored in corresponding differences in executive functions. Study IV was designed to 
examine the relation between hearing children’s mentalizing skills and their caregivers’ 
insight into their children’s social reasoning. Results from study I indicated that, when it 
comes to mentalizing abilities, the deaf children of deaf parents, i.e. so-called, native signers, 
who attend a school prioritizing education in sign language outperform the native signers 
from an oralist school and the deaf children from hearing homes attending either a bilingual 
or an oralist school. Taken together, studies II and III revealed that the deaf children’s 
mentalizing abilities were not dependent on individual differences in verbal working memory 
or executive functioning skills such as inhibitory control or attentional flexibility. There were 
no differences regarding results on the digit span task between the bilingual and the oralist 
native signers, or between the bilingual and the oralist late signers. There were no differences 
between any of the deaf or hearing groups on the two inhibitory control tasks and all the deaf 
groups performed equally well on the Wisconsin card sorting task. The main finding of study 
IV was that mothers who were more accurate in predicting their children’s reasoning in 
distressing social situations had children who had higher mentalizing scores. This relation still 
remained after chronological age and receptive vocabulary scores were controlled for. Taken 
together, the results emphasize the importance of continuous access to fluent conversations in 
a shared language between the child and those closest to him or her, both at home and at 
school, for the development of understanding other minds. 
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Introduction 
The ability to identify with others and to understand that other people have mental 
lives just like us is the cornerstone of human interaction. When communicating with 
each other we are in the habit of construing others’ intentions and beliefs, and trying 
to understand what is going on in their minds. We ascribe to others thoughts and 
feelings and on the basis of this we are able to predict their actions. Tomasello 
(2000) has argued that all cultural learning has been made possible due to this single 
form of social cognition. Each child with the ability to identify with others also has 
access to the cumulative cognitive development of past generations.  
The understanding of other people’s mental life has been called a “theory-of-
mind”, although “mind-reading” or “mentalizing” skills are frequently used 
synonymously, depending on the user’s theoretical convictions. In the last 25 years 
the question of how we develop mentalizing abilities has attracted great attention 
within philosophy, psychology, linguistics and primate studies. The widely replicated 
finding, based on passing the standard false-belief tasks, is that typically developing 
4-year-olds, unlike 3-year-olds, understand that another person holds his or her own 
beliefs about the world and will act according to these beliefs (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
Wellman, Cross and Watson (2001) conducted a meta-analysis of over 178 separate 
studies and concluded that there occurs a genuine conceptual change in the 
understanding of others’ minds during the preschool years, with variations between 
different cultures being minor and insignificant. 
As the term “theory-of-mind” (ToM) suggests, one main explanation concerning 
the development of mentalizing abilities has been that children form their 
understanding of the world and of other people in much the same way as scientists 
form theories. Since the late 1990s, however, more emphasis has been placed on the 
social part of mentalizing development, exploring how coming to understand other 
minds relates to early social interaction and language development. Within this 
perspective, deaf children with various conversational experiences constitute 
interesting groups for research since they offer an opportunity to disentangle some 
of the variables thought to be of importance for the development of mentalizing 
skills.  
 
Understanding other minds 
Theoretical positions 
The nature and origins of developing mentalizing abilities have been, and still are, 
the target of a considerable theoretical debate. One influential view has long been 
that the development of theory-of-mind is in some way theory-like. The so-called 
theory-theorists see the child as developing a set of principles about the world and 
other people in much the same way as scientists form theories by experimentation 
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and observation. Such theories are seen as ‘defeasible’ (Gopnik, 1993), i.e. they can 
be changed and revised. A change occurs when accumulating experience and 
hypothesis-testing suggests a modification of old principles. Thus, according to 
‘theory-theory’ a child undergoes a ‘paradigm-shift’ around the age of four when it 
passes the false-belief test. The proponents of theory-theory also claim that we do 
not have direct first-person access to our own mental states but have to construct an 
understanding of these in the same way that we construct an understanding of 
others’ mental states. This view is supported by the fact that when 3-year-olds are 
not able to report the false beliefs of others, they are equally ignorant of their own 
previous false beliefs (Gopnik, 1993). Researchers adopting this theoretical position 
have postulated a number of landmarks in the development towards an adult-like 
understanding of minds. Wellman and Liu (2004) have identified various items 
where, for most children, a pass on a later item follows passes on all earlier items. In 
this way understanding desires (understanding that two persons can have different 
desires for the same object) precedes understanding beliefs (understanding that two 
persons can have different beliefs about the same object), and differentiating 
between real and apparent emotions (understanding that a person can feel one thing 
but display a different emotion) is considered to be the most difficult task during the 
pre-school years. 
Another approach to explaining the development of mentalizing abilities is to 
assume that mental concepts are innate. Within the “modularity theory” (e.g. Leslie, 
1994) the emergence of mental understanding is understood as being dependent on 
biological maturation of cognitive structures, or modules, in the brain. In other 
words, the concepts of mental representation are developed within the cognitive 
structures in much the same way as colour concepts are introduced by the 
mechanisms of colour vision. One does not form theories of what colour is or need 
to discover theories of particular colours (Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004). 
According to the view of modularity theorists, mentalizing abilities are governed by 
the stage-like development of domain-specific modular mechanisms. While this so-
called “theory-of-mind mechanism” (ToMM) leads to an early development of 
mental understanding, effective reasoning about mental concepts is additionally 
dependent on the development of an information-processing device, referred to by 
Leslie et al. as a “Selection Processor” (SP). This processor is responsible for 
performing executive functions such as inhibiting a pre-potent response, which 
among other things is important for performance on false-belief tasks.  
Yet another way of explaining theory-of-mind development involves 
emphasizing children’s introspective awareness of their own mental states (Flavell, 
1999). This theory, known as “simulation theory”, states that we have privileged 
access to our own inner world. All that is needed is the capacity to reason by analogy 
and to imagine the mental states of other people through a kind of role-taking 
process. The idea of mental simulation originally comes from children’s pretend 
play. In the same way as an 18-month-old child can use one object to represent 
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something else, a 4-year-old can imagine someone else’s inner states (Lewis & 
Carpendale, 2002).  
Carpendale and Lewis (2004) suggest what they argue to be yet another, a fourth 
alternative in studying theory-of-mind development. Here the role of social 
interaction has been put into focus in the understanding of developmental changes. 
In this kind of constructivist account, social understanding is seen as occurring in 
triadic interactions where (a) children’s knowledge builds upon communication 
together with (b) others about (c) the world. Engaging in reciprocal interaction as 
well as exposure to talk about mental states is pointed out to be cornerstones in the 
development of social understanding. 
False beliefs 
In order to demonstrate that someone can ascribe mental states like thoughts and 
beliefs to oneself and others it is useful to construct a situation where a belief is 
incorrect. The by far most commonly employed method when assessing children’s 
mentalizing abilities has been to use a so-called false-belief task. This task was 
originally developed by Wimmer and Perner (1983) based on the suggestions made 
by Dennett (1978) on Premack and Woodruff’s (1978) article concerning 
chimpanzees’ theory-of-mind abilities. There are now two main versions of the 
false-belief task. In the Unexpected Location task, a story character places an object 
(e.g. chocolate) in one location. While he or she is away the object will be transferred 
to a new location. The child who is tested has seen the transference, but has to 
figure out that the story character will look for the object where he or she falsely 
believes it is located, and not where it actually is. Thus, the child is asked a test 
question “Where will [Maxi] look for the chocolate?” accompanied by two control 
questions, “Where did [Maxi] first put the chocolate” and “Where is the chocolate 
now?” (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In the Unexpected Content task, the child is shown a 
familiar candy box and is asked what he or she thinks is inside. Having been shown 
that something other than candy is inside, the child is then asked what someone else 
who has not looked inside would think the box contains. Again the child has to 
understand that others behave according to their own beliefs about reality, even 
when these are inaccurate. To pass the task the child also has to correctly answer a 
question about his or her own false belief, “When I first asked you, before we 
looked inside, what did you think was in the box?” and to correctly answer the 
question “What is really in the box?” (Perner et al., 1987). These classic and well-
known procedures have been frequently used in many studies with various 
modifications. 
In contrast to the tasks testing the understanding of false mental representation, 
a task testing the understanding of false physical representation has been developed 
by Zaitchik (1990). This task was constructed in order to demonstrate that possible 
difficulties with solving false-belief tasks might be due to difficulties in 
understanding the concept of representation in general. In this task an experimenter 
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first takes a photo of the child using a Polaroid camera, and together they then 
watch the developing photograph. Next, the child is shown a teddy bear holding a 
banana. The experimenter then takes a photograph of the teddy bear. While the 
photograph is placed to develop face down, the assistant replaces the banana with 
an apple. The child is then shown two photos taken beforehand, and asked to point 
to the photo that matches the developing photograph. Two control questions are 
then asked, “What was the teddy bear holding before?” and “What is the teddy bear 
holding now?” In the original study typically developing 4- to 5-year-old children 
performed at chance level on this task while passing the false-belief tasks (Zaitchik, 
1990). Later studies have, however, contradicted the suggestion that typically 
developed children would find the false-belief tasks easier than the false-photograph 
task (Peterson & Siegal, 2000). Instead, the false-photo task has proved to be 
constantly easier than the false-belief tasks.  
Relationships with social interaction 
The above mentioned theories, i.e. theory-theory, modulation theory and simulation 
theory, have been criticized for being individualistic and for not taking into account 
the role of social interaction in developing mentalizing abilities (Carpendale & Lewis, 
2004). In the last decade there has been a growing interest in examining the 
relationships between performance on false-belief tasks and different social and 
contextual factors. To this end, number of siblings in the family has been shown to 
correlate with children’s mentalizing abilities (Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Lewis, 
Freeman, Kyriakidou, Maridaki-Kassotaki, & Berridge, 1996; McAlister & Peterson, 
2007; Perner, Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994). Jenkins and Astington explain this finding 
with the increased possibilities of interactions that a larger number of siblings 
provide. They also believe that the intimacy of sibling relationships is especially 
suitable for acquiring intimate kinds of knowledge such as knowledge of others’ 
beliefs. Lewis et al. (1996) found, however, that the frequency of daily interactions 
with older relatives was a stronger predictor of insight into others’ mental states. 
Harris (1992) stressed the role of multiple viewpoints offered to a child by several 
possible interlocutors, facilitating the growing insight into other minds. Variables 
concerning family background, such as parental education and occupational class 
have also been shown to contribute to the development of social cognition (Cutting 
& Dunn, 1999). Children from middle-class families in this particular study 
performed significantly better than children from working-class families on the false-
belief, affective labelling (naming four felt faces portraying happy, sad, angry and 
frightened expressions), and affective perspective-taking tasks (understanding of the 
links between particular situations and emotions). Furthermore, attachment security 
has been shown to have an impact on mentalizing skills (Fonagy, Redfern, & 
Charman, 1997). This supports the view that theory-of-mind development is an 
inter-subjective process. Meins et al. (2002) have, however, found that a mother’s 
use of mental state talk to her children, rather than attachment security in general, 
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was correlated to children’s false-belief performance. They further found that only 
those mental state comments in a play situation that actually matched with the 
child’s concurrent state of mind, rather than usage of mental state comments in 
general, were related to the children’s later ToM performance (Meins et al., 2003). 
They propose that mothers’ appropriate comments on mental states draw attention 
to the existence of mental states, and help later to make sense of these inner 
experiences by combining them with external linguistic comments. Similarly, 
Peterson and Slaughter (2003) have shown that mothers’ tendency to explain 
everyday social events to their children in terms of mental states, as assessed with a 
questionnaire, was related to their 4- to 5-year-olds’ theory-of-mind performance. 
Ruffman, Slade and Crowe (2002) found a causal relationship between mothers’ 
earlier mental-state utterances in a picture-describing task and the children’s later 
theory-of-mind understanding. Taken together, these studies suggest that the 
development of mentalizing abilities is supported by the kind of family talk that in 
one way or another draws attention to others’ internal lives. 
Language and mentalizing ability 
The relationship between mentalizing abilities and language development is 
complex, depending on the aspects of language and mentalizing that are taken into 
account. For these reasons, Astington and Baird (2005) divide language into 
functional and structural parts. As one of the functions of language, besides 
representation, is communication, the aspect of conversational pragmatics is thought 
to be the crucial issue by some researchers. Proponents of this view suggest that 
children begin to understand that other people have minds with different 
perspectives by participating in everyday conversations with other family members. 
The most important thing is not the content of the conversation but the experience 
of exchanging different views with people through disagreements and 
misunderstandings. Tomasello (2000) has emphasized that the constant shifting of 
perspectives in the back-and-forth discourse with others provides the main motor in 
the development towards a theory-of-mind. He also believes that the conflicts and 
disputes, occurring mainly between siblings when they both desire the same toys, or 
when they want to engage in the same activity at the same time or have conflicts 
involving beliefs, are of particular importance. Similarly, Dunn and Brophy (2005) 
have argued that it is not only the talk about mental states that is important for 
theory-of-mind understanding, but rather the context and purpose of the talk, as 
well as with whom one has this kind of conversation. They have shown among 
other things that mothers’ “causal talk” was associated with later emotional 
understanding in their children. However, the children performed more successfully 
on later cognitive assessments if the causal talk had taken place in the context of 
play, comforting or joking, and not in the context of controlling. Moeller and Schick 
(2006) found a specific effect of mothers’ use of mental state terms on their deaf 
children’s false-belief performance. Nelson (2005) describes the development of 
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mentalizing abilities as entering a “community of minds”: To understand other 
minds is to learn to participate through language in a shared belief system. In the 
same vein, Hobson (2004) suggests that social understanding emerges pre-lingually 
as a result of interacting with others. According to him, to understand others’ 
subjective experiences, one has to relate to these others with emotions. A pre-
linguistic child’s active involvement in dyadic and triadic interactions is thus a 
starting point for understanding mental states and developing language about the 
mind. 
On the structural level some researchers have focused on the lexical semantics of 
mental state terms, arguing that these play an important role in theory-of-mind 
development. While the proponents of the pragmatics view emphasize the reading 
of other’s intentions in communication, those focusing on the semantics view 
propose that it is the exposure to mental state terms in communication that is 
relevant for the development of theory-of-mind. Olson (1988) suggests that before 
children acquire language, their behaviour cannot be characterized in intentional 
terms at all. When an observer ascribes mental states to a pre-linguistic child (“Baby 
thinks the mother is going to leave”), it is only for the convenience of the observer 
doing the ascribing; the mental states are not true. It is only when children learn to 
talk that they also learn to organize their perceptions in terms of mental states. 
Beliefs and intentions are, according to Olson, only “the psychological counterparts 
of saying things” (p. 423). Similarly, Lewis and Carpendale (2002) question the 
division of language and theory-of-mind. They suggest that thinking about a mental 
world is not separate from learning to talk about a mental world and that these two 
are inextricably intertwined. Much like learning the sense of multiplication develops 
at the same time as the child learns how to multiply, he or she begins to understand 
mentalizing at the same time as he or she learns to talk about mental states. 
De Villiers and de Villiers (2000) have argued that the syntactical structure of 
language is required in order to develop an understanding of other’s mental states. 
The idea is that for expressing or thinking about mental states an embedded 
proposition called a complement is necessary: “he thought (the chocolate was in the 
cupboard)”. Here, the overall sentence can be true but the embedded complement 
can refer to a proposition that is false. Only after learning this type of syntax are 
discussions of what is going on in other minds possible. Thus, complementation 
allows representation of someone’s mental world, which can be distinct from our 
own mental world. 
Bearing in mind that our knowledge about children’s mentalizing skills is mostly 
derived from their ability to pass certain tasks, a further aspect of the connection 
between theory-of-mind and language concerns task performance. Some 
researchers’ direct attention to the difference between competence and performance 
and to the possibility that linguistic and other cognitive task requirements may mask 
children’s underlying conceptual understanding of the mind (de Villiers & de 
Villiers, 2000). Children usually have to listen to a story or understand an 
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experimenter explaining task materials. They may understand false beliefs, but due 
to the linguistic complexity of the task, still fail to answer correctly. In this case 
language development has no crucial role in the underlying conceptual development, 
but rather has an indirect influence through its impact on performance. Some 
authors have for example argued that children may have difficulties with the 
conversational aspects of the false-belief tasks (Siegal & Beattie, 1991). They have 
shown that asking “Where will Maxi first look for his chocolate” rather than “Where 
will Maxi look for his chocolate”, helps even 3-year-olds pass this task. Similarly, 
Lewis and Osborne (1990) demonstrated that 3-year-olds passed the unexpected 
content false-belief task when the test question was temporally specified, “What will 
[name of friend] think is in the box before I take the top off?” However, Yazdi, German, 
Defeyter, and Siegal (2007) found that ‘look first’ question enhanced the 
performance of both 3-year-olds and older, 4- to 5-year-old children. If there had 
been a conceptual change in understanding of false-belief around the fourth-
birthday (Wellman et al., 2001) only children who are closest to that age could have 
been helped by the ‘look first’ question. This argument is also applicable to the 
research in Lewis and Osborne (1990). Instead the development of false-belief-
understanding could be explained both in terms of conceptual competence and 
performance factors.  
Also important when discussing the relationship between language and theory-
of-mind development are the aspects included in theory-of-mind. Lohmann, 
Tomasello, and Meyer (2005) and Tomasello (2000) are concerned with two levels of 
social understanding. They differentiate between the understanding of others as 
intentional agents with goals and perceptions, and the understanding of others as 
mental agents with goals and beliefs. They further claim that the first level, the 
understanding of others as intentional agents, is necessary for the development of 
language. People use language mainly to influence other persons’ attention and for 
this reason one needs to comprehend that other persons have intentions in the first 
place. The second level of social understanding, the understanding of others as 
mental agents whose behaviour is governed by beliefs, grows out of linguistic 
interactions. In this case, contrary to the first level, language precedes and promotes 
the understanding of other’s mental states. Different aspects of language 
development thus become important at different levels of theory-of-mind 
development. 
In summary, in order to obtain a complete picture of the relationship between 
language and mentalizing skills, the theoretical positions mentioned above can be 
seen as complementing each other. For infants to be able to start interacting with 
others a rudimentary pragmatic understanding is necessary. By becoming involved in 
interpersonal communication, children then have the possibility of learning mental-
state terms and sentential complements. In this way, they gradually begin to get a 
grip of the concept of mental states, to obtain awareness about other perspectives 
and then to learn to represent others’ false beliefs. 
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Theory-of-mind and executive functions 
Numerous studies have investigated the links between mentalizing abilities and other 
more domain-general cognitive processes. One approach to studying this 
relationship considers which aspects of the executive functions could be involved in 
mentalizing. Hughes (1998) has suggested a three-part model where executive 
functions fall into three distinctive factors: working memory, inhibitory control and 
attentional flexibility. Carlson, Moses, and Claxton (2004) have found that inhibition 
tasks were correlated with theory-of-mind performance in preschool children and 
that this correlation remained even after the effects of age, vocabulary and planning 
skills were partialed out. Hala, Hug, and Henderson (2003) demonstrated that 
executive functioning tasks that combined inhibitory control and working memory 
correlated significantly with the false-belief tasks. 
Another question within this area concerns whether executive functions can be 
seen as affecting children’s ability to express their mentalizing abilities, or if these 
abilities are crucial for the emergence of mentalizing abilities (Carlson & Moses, 
2001; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006). According to the expression 
account children fail in theory-of-mind tasks due to executive difficulties that mask 
the competence that they already possess. The classic false-belief task typically 
requires a child to inhibit his or her own pre-potent response, taken care of by the 
Selection Processor (SP) in Leslie’s (2004) model, in order to correctly answer the 
test question. The emergence account explains the link between theory-of-mind and 
executive functions in terms of more deep-seated problems with the latter. Here the 
executive skills are thought to be necessary for comprehending and reasoning about 
mental states. In a cross-cultural study with Chinese and U.S. hearing preschoolers, 
Sabbagh et al. (2006) found that Chinese 3,5-year-olds performed as well as U.S. 4-
year-olds on the executive functioning tasks, but they still performed worse than 
U.S. children on ToM tasks. The authors conclude that as good executive 
functioning by itself was not sufficient to perform well on ToM tasks, other factors 
might be necessary to promote ToM development, i.e. the opportunity to discuss 
mental states. Thus, these results show that the relation between ToM and executive 
functions is not attributable only to the executive demands that ToM tasks require. 
Similar results were found by Woolfe, Want and Siegal (2002) with a deaf sample. In 
this study the native and the late signers performed equally well on the Wisconsin 
Card-Sorting task, while the late signers were significantly worse on the false-belief 
tasks. Thus, the advantage of the native signers in ToM tasks could not be explained 
by differences in executive functioning. 
Mentalizing in atypical children 
Wimmer and Perner (1983) demonstrated that typically developing children around 
their fourth year pass the false-belief task and can thus be said to have acquired a 
basic theory-of-mind. Children with autism, however, were shown to have 
remarkable problems with taking the other’s perspective (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). 
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At the same time, children with Down’s syndrome succeeded on the same tasks, 
suggesting that children with autism experience problems when it comes to 
mentalizing that are not simply cognitive. As autism has a neurodevelopmental 
background, these findings pointed to a neurological basis for theory-of-mind. 
Research with other atypically developing children, first with deaf children 
(Peterson & Siegal, 1995), proposed that communicative experiences could be 
related to differences in mentalizing skills between various groups of children. Deaf 
children of hearing parents were shown to perform on a lower level on the false-
belief tasks than deaf children who grew up within a deaf family. This research 
concluded that fluent interaction between parents and children is crucial for 
developing insight into other minds. Recent findings of delayed theory-of-mind 
development among children with visual impairment (Hobson, 2004) and children 
with severe speech and physical impairment (Falkman, Dahlgren Sandberg & 
Hjelmquist, 2005) seem to support the importance of exposure to and participation 
in conversation when it comes to understanding other minds. In the present thesis 
therefore the focus is on deaf children who grow up in environments with different 
access to language and conversations, deaf children in Italy, Estonia and Sweden 
who grow up with deaf or hearing parents and are instructed in spoken or signed 
language at their school. 
 
Deafness 
There are approximately 70 children born deaf each year in Sweden (SDR, 2007). 
Across all age groups there are 8 000 – 10 000 deaf people in Sweden, i.e. persons 
who were born deaf or have become deaf before acquiring a language. Together 
with those who have become deaf after language acquisition as well as hearing 
children of deaf parents, there are around 30 000 users of sign language in Sweden 
(SDR, 2007). In Estonia 8 – 10 children are born deaf each year (Laiapea, Miljan, 
Sutrop, & Toom, 2003). The total number of deaf people in Estonia is estimated to 
be 1 400, while there are approximately 4 500 sign language users in total. In Italy 
the number of deaf people is estimated to be 60 000, including all categories of 
deafness, and the total number of prelingually deaf people is about 50 000 (ENS, 
2007). The educational situation for deaf children in Italy varies considerably, not 
least due to the strong oralist tradition which was dominant until about twenty years 
ago (ENS, 2007). Today, therefore, one can find oralist schools as well as 
bimodal/bilingual ones. According to different sources the number of deaf people 
varies considerably, probably due to deaf people with various degrees of hearing 
impairment being included as well as to people differently considering themselves as 
belonging to the deaf community or not. 
Around five to six percent of deaf children have deaf parents and 90 percent of 
deaf parents have hearing children. A basic distinction can be made between hearing 
loss that is present at birth, i.e. pre-lingual deafness, and that which is acquired post-
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lingually, i.e. after the child has begun to acquire a language. In this thesis, only pre-
lingually deaf children are included. 
There were about 500 children and 1 000 adults with cochlea implants (CI) in 
Sweden in August 2007 (Barnplantorna - The Swedish Cochlea Implant Children 
Organisation, personal communication, August 29, 2007). In Estonia 56 children 
and 13 adults had a CI in August 2007 (Implantaadilaste Selts, 2007). Twelve of the 
Estonian school-age children were attending a deaf school, while 11 children were 
educated in mainstream schools. 
Deaf education 
The Swedish Sign Language was officially accepted by the Swedish government as a 
language in its own right in 1981. Before this deaf children were mostly educated 
according to the oralist method with lipreading and the use of the spoken language. 
Education in the six special schools for the hearing impaired in Sweden is co-
ordinated by the National Agency for Special Schools for the Deaf and Hard of 
Hearing (SPM). These special schools offer students instruction in sign language or 
speech, with the possibility of choosing different instructional languages for 
different subjects and even changing the choice during the course of schooling 
(SPM, 2007). The goal is for students to become functionally bilingual, meaning that 
they should be able to use both languages to communicate, to seek new knowledge 
and to influence their own lives. In order to reach this goal SPM tailors instruction 
to meet individual needs in signing, speaking, reading and writing. Usually classes 
with sign language as the first language and classes for children with impaired 
hearing where spoken Swedish is the first language are both offered. Every school 
aims to be flexible in its working methods so that each child is treated according to 
his or her own needs. The schools also provide instruction in sign language for 
siblings who have unimpaired hearing and children whose parents are deaf. In this 
way, in addition to learning sign language, the children also have the opportunity to 
experience a deaf environment and to gain insight into the situation of their deaf 
siblings. A sign language training programme for parents is available through a 
special curriculum established by the Swedish National Agency for Education. This 
program is designed to provide parents with functional sign language skills so that 
they can interact with their children, thereby supporting their child’s development 
(TUFF, 2007). 
Unlike the other Nordic and Baltic countries, the Estonian government officially 
accepted Estonian Sign Language as late as in March 2007. Accordingly, deaf 
education has until recently followed the oralist tradition by using spoken language 
and lipreading. Today, however, Estonian deaf children can choose between deaf 
schools following different educational philosophies. At schools following the oralist 
method children are taught mostly by hearing teachers to use their remaining 
hearing to talk and lip-read with sign language being avoided as much as possible. 
The schools aim to prepare their students to manage independently in a hearing 
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society without any need of sign language interpreters. Fifty four percent of the 
children studying according to the oralist approach today have a hearing loss of 
more than 96 dB, an additional 18 percent have a severe hearing loss (76 – 95 dB in 
their better ear). In 1994 a school with a bilingual approach was established. 
Estonian Sign Language is used at this school for classroom instructions and 
Estonian is taught as a second language for reading and writing. The students are 
educated by teachers, most of whom are deaf themselves, in sign language up to the 
fifth grade. Spoken language appears thereafter as a separate subject in the 
curriculum once a day. 
Deaf children and mentalizing skills 
Deaf children’s development of mentalizing skills is of great theoretical interest since 
they offer an opportunity to disentangle some of the variables thought to be of 
importance in this respect. Difficulties in theory-of-mind understanding among deaf 
children quantitatively at a level similar to problems of autistic children would 
suggest that neurobiological makeup is not the single reason behind having 
problems in understanding other minds. 
Despite the great popularity of theory-of-mind research among developmental 
psychologists, relatively little is known about how deaf children acquire insight into 
other minds. Several studies have shown that non-native late signing deaf children, 
i.e. deaf children who grow up with hearing parents, and thus do not have sign 
language as their first language, tend to perform at a lower level on false-belief tasks 
than their hearing age mates matched on mental age (Courtin, 2000; de Villiers & de 
Villiers, 2000; Peterson, 2004; Peterson & Siegal, 1999, 2000; Russell et al., 1998; 
Woolfe et al., 2002). In the study by Russell et al. forty per cent of a group of deaf 
late signers between the ages of 13 and 16 failed a modified standard unexpected 
location false-belief task compared to fifteen per cent of 3- to 5-year-old hearing 
children. In contrast, however, native signing deaf children, i.e. deaf children who 
have deaf parents, do not lag behind the typically developing hearing children in 
their theory-of-mind development. This pattern seems to be specific to the 
representation of other minds rather than to problems with understanding the 
concept of representation in general. In a study by Peterson and Siegal (1998) it was 
shown that while less than half of the 5- to 11-year-old deaf children from hearing 
homes displayed an accurate understanding of false-belief, a majority of these 
children passed the task of photographic representation, developed by Zaitchik 
(1990). A hearing comparison group of 4-year-old children performed equally well 
on both the false-belief and false-photograph task in this particular study. Another 
finding is that deaf children from hearing homes show difficulties with theory-of-
mind understanding even if verbal task-requirements are minimized. Using the 
“thought pictures” task Woolfe et al. (2002) and Falkman and Hjelmquist (2007) 
have demonstrated that the difference between native signing and late signing deaf 
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children in mentalizing skills remains significant when the theory-of-mind task has 
been made more easily comprehensible by using minimal verbal instructions. 
Interestingly, research demonstrates that profoundly and prelingually deaf 
children from hearing homes who are trained in an oral language mode are also 
delayed in developing insight into other minds (Courtin, 2000; de Villiers & de 
Villiers, 2000; Peterson, 2004). Peterson and Siegal (1999) have found, however, that 
oralist instructed deaf children performed comparably to native signing children. 
One reason for these conflicting results could be the different hearing status of 
children included in these studies. In Peterson and Siegal the children included in 
the oralist deaf group had a moderate to severe hearing loss whilst in Courtin, and 
de Villiers and de Villiers, only children with severe or profound hearing 
impairments were included. Thus, with the resulting differences in access to 
everyday conversation depending on the children’s hearing level, these children 
could develop mentalizing skills at different ages. 
Previous research on mentalizing skills among deaf children has been carried out 
in different countries, with different views on deaf education and children being 
exposed to different sign languages. It is striking that although deaf children are 
exposed to various forms of languages in education, the delayed development of 
mentalizing abilities among deaf children of hearing parents is a consistent finding 
across various studies. In the majority of deaf studies from the UK and Australia, 
children are recruited from schools which follow the philosophy of Total 
Communication where spoken language is usually combined with signed English 
(English is translated in a word-by-word way according to English syntax), 
supplemented by lipreading, finger spelling and British Sign Language/Auslan. 
(Peterson, 2004; Peterson & Siegal, 1999; Russell et al., 1998). In other studies deaf 
children are recruited from mainstream schools with sign language provision or 
special schools with bilingual communication using both spoken English and British 
Sign Language (Woolfe et al., 2002), are orally taught (de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000) 
or educated primarily in sign language (Falkman, 2005). 
The importance of fluent communication with a caregiver for the development of 
mentalizing skills was demonstrated by Meins et al. (2002) in a sample of hearing 
children. The authors showed that mothers’ talk and “mind-mindedness” with their 
hearing children at six months of age were predictive of mentalizing skills at 48 
months of age. In dyads consisting of a hearing parent and a deaf child the parent’s 
use of appropriate mental state comments, i.e. mind-mindedness, must be more 
difficult to accomplish. Among other things, Meadow-Orlans and Spencer (1996) 
have shown that these dyads spend less time in coordinated joint attention and 
mothers tend to interrupt the child’s attention by initiating new unrelated activities. 
Wood (1991) has argued that hearing adults, when faced with communicational 
problems with deaf children, become more controlling and negative. Deaf children 
thus become over-controlled and there is less space for flexible and creative 
discussions. This pattern of interaction is strikingly parallel to the interaction 
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between children with cerebral palsy and their parents (Hjelmquist & Dahlgren 
Sandberg, 1996). Children with severe cerebral palsy also show delays in false-belief 
development (Dahlgren, Dahlgren Sandberg, & Hjelmquist, 2003; Falkman et al., 
2005). A key issue from this perspective is whether this mismatching in early 
interaction with caregivers is reflected in later differences in mentalizing abilities. 
Taken together, previous deaf studies consistently suggest that deaf children 
from hearing families, educated in either spoken or signed language, are delayed in 
developing mentalizing skills compared to their native-signing and hearing age 
mates. The results of these studies point to the importance of participation in 
everyday conversations with family members and friends that in some way or 
another facilitate the understanding of others as mental agents (Woolfe et al., 2002). 
 
Summary of empirical studies 
General and specific aims 
The general aim of the empirical studies was to explore the relationship between 
mentalizing on the one hand and different language experiences and cognitive 
characteristics on the other hand. The aim of study I was to determine whether 
access to sign language as the medium of instruction influences theory-of-mind 
reasoning among deaf children. In study II the effects of working memory skills on 
the relation between language of instruction and understanding false-belief was 
examined. Study III aimed at testing if differences in theory-of-mind skills between 
different groups of deaf children, as reported previously, were mirrored in 
corresponding differences in executive functions. Study IV was designed to examine 
the relation between hearing children’s theory-of-mind and their caregivers’ insight 
into the children’s social reasoning. 
Study I 
The aim of study I was to examine if the language of instruction in school affects 
theory-of-mind reasoning among deaf children. Previous studies concerning theory-
of-mind abilities among deaf children have shown that deaf children from hearing 
homes lag several years behind hearing children in performance on false-belief tasks 
(Falkman, Roos, & Hjelmquist, 2007; Peterson & Siegal, 1999; Russell et al., 1998; 
Woolfe et al., 2002). Deaf children from homes with at least one deaf parent or 
older sibling using sign language, however, perform at the same level as typically 
developing hearing children. In the present study we thus aimed to go beyond the 
distinction of deaf children as native – non-native signers by dividing these groups 
further with respect to the language used at their school, i.e. spoken or signed 
language. We also broadened the scope of theory-of-mind tasks included in previous 
deaf research by adding tasks designed to test understanding of affective perspective 
taking as well as more advanced false-belief tasks.  
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Study II 
All mentalizing tasks typically impose some memory demands. To correctly answer 
questions about someone else’s perspective, children have to follow and remember 
the whole storyline and keep track of their own and other’s alternative 
representations. Additionally, in order to give a correct answer about another’s false 
belief, a child has to suppress his or her own knowledge about the real state of 
affairs. The development of working memory has been shown to follow a different 
pattern among deaf children compared to their hearing age mates (Boutla, Supalla, 
Newport, & Bavelier, 2004; Emmorey & Wilson, 2004; Wilson, Bettger, Niculae, & 
Klima, 1997). Native signing deaf people typically have a shorter forward recall span 
than hearing people. Wilson et al. have also shown that deaf native signing children 
do not differ to the same extent as hearing children on verbal recall of digits forward 
and backward. A standard finding is that hearing children are worse at recalling 
digits backward than forward. The aim of study II was to ensure that differences 
between the deaf groups on mentalizing tasks do not depend on underlying 
problems with working memory. 
Study III 
The aim of study III was to examine if there are differences in executive functions 
between the four groups of deaf children, i.e. bilingual native signers, oralist native 
signers, bilingual late signers and oralist late signers, which might account for the 
differences in their theory-of-mind reasoning. Previous research has shown that 
executive functions and theory-of-mind performance are related in typically 
developing hearing pre-school children (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Hala et al., 2003; 
Hughes, 1998; Sabbagh et al., 2006). For deaf children, on the other hand, Woolfe et 
al. (2002) found no significant differences between native and late signers on 
executive functioning tasks. In this particular study native and late signers performed 
equally well on the Wisconsin card sorting task while late signers were significantly 
worse on the false-belief tasks. Thus, the advantage of native signers in ToM tasks 
could not be explained by differences in executive functioning. 
Study IV 
In this study hearing children only were included. One aspect of language and 
communication that has recently been given a lot of attention in the context of 
theory-of-mind development is a caregiver’s tendency to treat the child as a mental 
agent. Among others, Meins et al. (2003) demonstrated that mothers’ mental state 
comments in a play situation with their infants that matched with the child’s 
concurrent state of mind, were related to the children’s later ToM performance. 
They propose that mothers’ appropriate mental comments draw attention to the 
existence of mental states, and later help to make sense of these inner experiences by 
combining them with external linguistic comments. The aim of study IV was to 
examine whether a caregiver’s insight into his/her child’s mind relates to the child’s 
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socio-cognitive understanding even in middle childhood among hearing children. As 
older children expand their conversational environments to include people outside 
the mother-child dyad to a greater extent, fathers and teachers were also included in 
study IV.  
 
Methods 
Participants 
An overview of the different groups in relation to the four empirical studies is 
given in Table 1. 
Study I. Two experiments were included in this study. In experiment 1, the 
participants were 97 profoundly deaf Italian children, aged 4 to 12 years, of whom 
41 were late signers (M = 10 years 1 month) and 56 were native signers (M = 8 years 
7 months). Of the 41 late signers, 23 children attended oralist schools and 18 
children attended bimodal/bilingual schools. For the 56 native signers, comparative 
figures were 20 and 36 respectively. 105 hearing children were recruited as controls 
from schools from north-eastern Italy. They were divided into four age groups: 3- to 
4-year-olds, 5- to 6-year-olds, 7- to 8-year-olds, and 9- to 10-year-olds. 
 The participants in experiment 2 were 61 deaf children, ranging in age from 7 to 
16 years of whom 24 were native signers from deaf families where sign language was 
used in the home (M = 12 years 3 months) and 37 were late signers from hearing 
families (M = 12 years 3 months). The native signers all attended schools in Estonia: 
11 attended a bilingual school and 13 attended an oralist school. Of the 37 late 
signers, 16 attended a bilingual school in Estonia and 21 attended a bilingual school 
in Sweden. All children were prelingually deaf and none of them had any additional 
disabilities such as cerebral palsy, autism, mental retardation or visual impairment. In 
addition to the deaf children, 26 hearing children, aged 6 to 15 years, were recruited 
from schools located in Estonia to act as controls.  
Study II and III. Eighty Estonian children, ranging in age from 6 to 16 years 
participated in studies II and III. The deaf sample consisted of 54 prelingually and 
severely or profoundly deaf children without any additional disabilities. They were 
divided into four subgroups according to the mode used in daily conversations with 
other family members and the educational policy of their school. Of the 24 native 
signers, 11 attended a bilingual school and 13 attended an oralist school. The group 
of 30 late signing deaf children consisted of 16 children attending a bilingual school 
and 14 children from an oralist school. The comparison group consisted of 26 
hearing children, aged 6 to 15 years, from Estonia.  
Study IV. Thirty-nine typically developing hearing children (25 boys and 14 girls) 
between 7 years 0 months and 9 years 11 months (M = 8 years 7 months) from a 
primary school in western Sweden were included in this study. Thirty-two mothers, 
30 fathers and 30 teachers filled in and returned the questionnaire. 
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Table 1. Groups of children participating in the empirical studies.  
 
Group and language access 
Study I 
Exp. 1* 
Study I 
Exp. 2* 
Study 
II 
Study 
III 
Study 
IV 
Native signers      
  Bilingual (Estonia) (n=11)  x x x  
  Oralist (Estonia) (n=13)  x x x  
  Bimodal/bilingual (Italy) (n=36) x     
  Oralist (Italy) (n=20) x      
Late signers      
  Bilingual (Estonia) (n=16)  x x x  
  Bilingual (Sweden) (n=21)  x    
  Oralist (Estonia) (n=14)   x x  
  Bimodal/bilingual (Italy) (n=18) x     
  Oralist (Italy) (n=23) x     
Hearing children (Estonia) (n=26)  x x x  
Hearing children (Sweden) (n=39)     x 
Hearing children (Italy) (n=105) x     
Note. Exp. 1 = Italian sample, Exp. 2 = Estonian and Swedish sample 
 
Procedure 
As the researchers contributing to the studies in this thesis are not fluent in any of 
the three sign languages used, myself having practically no knowledge, all the testing 
procedure was carefully prepared with the help of deaf assistants and hearing 
interpreters. The exact formulation of the language used for the tasks and questions 
was developed in consultation with a hearing interpreter and a deaf assistant at the 
bilingual school in Estonia, and in consultation with a hearing interpreter and two 
deaf native speakers of Swedish Sign Language in Sweden. In this way, steps were 
taken to make sure that accurate sign language was used in the testing procedure, 
taking into account the restriction that no researcher was fluent in any of the three 
sign languages.  
All the Italian deaf children were tested by a hearing professional sign language 
interpreter following the procedure used by Woolfe et al. (2002).  
In Estonia and Sweden each child was tested individually in a quiet room at his or 
her school. An assistant who knew the children well carried out the testing. At the 
bilingual school in Estonia the assistant was deaf herself, so an interpreter 
simultaneously interpreted all communication between the child and the assistant 
from Estonian Sign Language to Estonian. This made it possible for the experiment 
leader to follow the procedure. Children from deaf families at the oralist school in 
Estonia were tested in sign language by a hearing assistant who had grown up with a 
deaf parent and was fluent in Estonian Sign Language. The oralist late signing deaf 
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children were tested in spoken Estonian. The Swedish deaf children were tested by 
an assistant who did not suffer from any hearing impairment herself, but as she had 
grown up with a deaf parent and worked daily with deaf children, she was bilingual 
and thus fluent in Swedish Sign Language.  
To avoid possible ambiguities when analyzing answers after the testing, test 
sessions in Estonia and Sweden were video recorded with two cameras. Test 
sessions did not last longer than approximately 20 minutes in order to avoid fatigue 
effects. We also consulted a professor of English, who grew up in Sweden with an 
Estonian parent, concerning semantic fields of epistemic verbs such as think and 
believe in English, Swedish and Estonian. 
 
Tasks 
Studies I, II and III 
Information regarding which tasks were included in each study is shown in Table 
2.  
 
Table 2. Tasks included in each study.  
 Study I 
Exp. 1* 
Study I 
Exp. 2* 
Study II Study 
III 
Study 
IV 
Theory-of-mind tasks      
  Emotion recognition cartoons 1 & 2   x  x  
  Belief-desire based emotions  x  x  
  Unexpected contents  x x x  
  Unexpected location  x x x  
  Second-order false-belief  x  x  
  “Strange stories”  x  x x 
  “Faux pas”  x  x  
  “Thought pictures” x     
Working memory tasks      
  Digit span   x   
Executive functioning tasks      
  Go-no-go and Conflict tasks    x  
  Wisconsin card sorting task    x  
Other measures      
  Test of non-mental representation  x x x  
  Raven’s matrices x x x x  
  Italian Sign Language test x     
  Peabody picture vocabulary test     x 
  Maternal accuracy task     x 
Note. Exp. 1 = Italian sample, Exp. 2 = Estonian and Swedish sample 
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Theory-of-mind tasks 
Emotion Recognition Cartoon-1 (ERC-1). Following the procedure devised by 
Howlin, Baron-Cohen, and Hadwin (1999) to examine children’s recognition of 
emotions caused by situations, desires or beliefs, this measure involved presenting 
children with cartoon stories and asking them to report on the emotions of the main 
character as depicted in the stories. Two belief-based emotion stories were 
presented, each using three pictures. In the first story (ERC-1), the first picture 
showed two parents in a travel agency buying a holiday trip to the mountains. The 
second picture depicted the story character with “thought bubbles” of both his 
desire and his belief respectively. These showed a boy who wants to go skiing in the 
mountains, but who thinks that his parents have bought a trip to a seaside resort. 
Here the child was asked two control questions to ensure that he or she had 
understood what the story figure’s desire and belief were, “What does the boy 
want?” and “Where does the boy think they are going to travel?” Then the test 
question “How will the boy feel when he thinks that his parents have bought a trip 
to a seaside resort?” was asked. Since the story character does not know that they 
were actually going skiing and instead believes they are going to the seaside, he will 
consequently feel unhappy. The last picture showed the character happily 
encountering the outcome of the situation. The child was then asked the emotion 
control question, “How does the boy feel when he is skiing with his family?”  To 
pass this task, the child had to respond correctly to both the test question and the 
control questions about the character’s desire and belief, as well as the question 
about the character’s emotion in the outcome situation. 
Emotion Recognition Cartoon-2 (ERC-2).  In the second story, the task was again to 
predict a story character’s emotions taking into consideration both desire and belief.  
The child was told a story about a girl wanting to go to the cinema, not knowing it 
had sustained water damage and was therefore closed. The child was again asked to 
predict the character’s emotion both before (happy) and after (unhappy) witnessing 
the last picture that depicted the outcome. In both ERC-1 and ERC-2, the story 
character’s belief was false, while  the character’s desire was fulfilled in ERC-1, but 
unfulfilled in ERC-2. 
Belief-Desire Based Emotion Reasoning Task. This task also concerned emotion 
recognition abilities and followed the procedure used by Harris et al. (1989).  The 
child was first introduced to a toy rabbit described as liking Coca Cola and disliking 
milk. The child was then asked two control questions: “How does the rabbit feel 
when he is given a can of Coca Cola?” and “How does the rabbit feel when he is 
given some milk?” The child was then told the following: “The rabbit then went out 
for a walk and, while he was out, the cat replaced Coca Cola with milk in a Cola can. 
When the rabbit comes back from his walk, he is really thirsty. He can see the can 
on the table but he can’t see what’s inside the can.” The main test question followed 
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concerning emotion-inference based on the story character’s false-belief, “When the 
rabbit first comes back from his walk, how does he feel – happy or not happy?” 
Children who responded correctly to the test question were rated as successful only 
if they also passed the accompanying control questions, “How does the rabbit feel 
after he’s had a drink – happy or not happy?” and “What’s really in the can?” 
Unexpected Content Task. Following the procedure of Perner et al. (1987), the 
children were shown a “Smarties” tube that actually contained buttons. They were 
then asked what they thought was inside the tube. After they had discovered the 
contents, and when the tube was closed again, the children were asked two belief 
questions, one about the belief of another child in a different room, “If we ask your 
friend, what will he/she think is in here?” and one about their own prior belief, 
“When I first asked you about the content of the sweets box, before we looked 
inside, what did you think was in here?” 
Unexpected Change of Location Task. Following Hughes et al.’s (2000) modification 
of the classic Sally-Anne task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), this task consisted of a 
story accompanied by four pictures. The first picture showed a boy with a bag and 
an apple, and a girl with a box. In the second picture, the boy is depicted by putting 
the apple in his bag wanting to keep it safe. In the third picture, while the boy is 
outside playing, a girl takes the apple and puts it in her box instead. The fourth 
picture depicted the boy returning to pick up his apple. To pass this task, the child 
then had to answer correctly the test question “Where will the boy look for his 
apple?” as well as two control questions about the current location (“Where is the 
apple really?”) and the original location of the apple (“Where was the apple first of 
all?”). 
Second-Order False-Belief Task. In order to assess the children’s ability to attribute a 
mistaken belief about a belief to a story character, we used Hughes et al.’s (2000) 
“Chocolate” story based on the second-order task developed by Sullivan, Zaitchik, 
and Tager-Flusberg (1994). The story was about a granddad and his grandchildren 
and was again told with the help of pictures: “Granddad gives a chocolate bar to his 
grandchildren and asks them to put it away until Mum says they can have some. The 
children put the chocolate in the fridge and go out to play. Soon the boy feels thirsty 
and goes inside for a glass of water. He sees the chocolate in the fridge, wants to 
keep it for himself, and puts it in his bag. The girl is playing by the window and can 
therefore see what her brother is doing. The boy, however, is busy hiding the 
chocolate, so he does not notice the girl looking at him. Later, when the boy and girl 
are drinking tea, mum says that now they can have some of the chocolate.”  The 
children were then asked the test question, “Where does the boy think the girl will 
look for the chocolate?” In order to pass this task the child also had to respond 
correctly to a reality control question (“Where is the chocolate really?”) as well as a 
memory control question (“Where was the chocolate first of all?”) that were asked 
following the test question. 
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“Strange Story”. The children were read one of Happé’s (1994) “Strange Stories.”  
This involved an old woman walking home alone late at night. A man suddenly 
appears and comes towards her, wanting to ask what time it is. The old woman, 
seeing the man, starts to tremble and says, “Take my purse, just don’t hurt me 
please!” The children were then asked, “Was the man surprised to hear what the old 
lady said?” and “Why did she say that, when the man only wanted to ask what time 
it was?” Answers to the justification question were coded according to Happé’s 
procedure. One point was given for a clear indication of the woman’s false belief, 
e.g. referring to her belief that he was going to mug her, or her ignorance of his real 
intention. References to her trait (“She’s a nervous person”), or state (“She’s 
scared”), without remarking that her fear was unnecessary was given 0.5 point. 
Children were given a score of zero if they gave factually incorrect or irrelevant 
answers. 
“Faux Pas”. As defined by Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, and Plaisted 
(1999), a faux pas is “when a speaker says something without considering if it is 
something that the listener might not want to hear or know, and which typically has 
negative consequences that the speaker never intended.”  For the faux pas situation 
included in our studies, an inadvertently insulting story character was described who 
made critical remarks about a birthday present he had received (a toy airplane) 
without remembering that he was speaking to the person who gave it to him. After 
consulting the deaf assistants and a sign language interpreter, the original test 
questions were modified to make the task more easily comprehensible in sign 
language. The original questions in Baron-Cohen et al. were “In the story did 
someone say something that they should not have said” and “What did they say that 
they should not have said?”  In the present study, the deaf children were asked a 
faux pas detection question “In the story did someone say something that was 
improper?”  If the child said yes, he or she was then asked, “What was it that was 
improper?” In order to pass the test the children also had to answer correctly the 
comprehension question (“What did X give Y for his birthday?”) and false-belief 
question (“Did X remember that Y had given him the toy airplane for his 
birthday?”). 
“Thought pictures”. As in the procedure used by Wellman, Hollander, and Schult 
(1996) and Woolfe et al. (2002), two pictures were first shown to examine the 
children’s understanding of “thought bubbles”: one depicting a boy thinking about a 
dog (a boy with an attached thought bubble containing a dog) and the other 
depicting a boy with a real dog (a boy with a dog on a lead). The deaf children were 
asked in Italian Sign Language (LIS) (and the hearing in spoken Italian) to point to 
the picture showing a boy thinking about a dog. All the children who participated in 
Experiment 1 gave the correct answer. The children were then shown four ToM 
“thought pictures” (adapted from a procedure used by Custer, 1996): two pictures 
where the main character’s belief was false (FB), and the other two where the main 
character’s belief was true (TB). The four thought pictures were: 1) a boy fishing 
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thinks has caught a fish (TB = fish / FB = boot); 2) a girl thinks she sees a tall boy 
over a fence (TB = a tall boy / FB = a small boy standing on a box); 3) a man thinks 
he is reaching into a cupboard for a drink (TB = a drink / FB = a mouse); and 4) a 
man thinks he sees a fish in the sea (TB = a fish / FB = a mermaid). The content of 
the items in the FB and TB tasks was randomized across children. For each thought 
picture, children were asked a belief and a reality question. They were scored as 
having passed the task if they answered both questions correctly. Each child 
therefore received an FB score from 0 to 2 and a TB score from 0 to 2. 
 
Working memory tasks 
Digit Span subtest of the WISC (Wechsler, 1977) was used as a measure of verbal 
working memory. The children were told, in Estonian or Estonian Sign Language, to 
repeat sequences of numbers signed, or read out loud, by the experimenter, first in a 
forward recall condition and then in a backward recall condition. Two trials of each 
sequence length were given to each child. The score for each task was the length of 
the longest sequence with at least one completely correct response. 
 
Executive functioning tasks 
Go-no-go and Conflict task. Becker Visual Go-No-Go and Conflict tasks were used 
to measure inhibitory control skills (Becker et al., 1987). With the appearance of two 
different stimuli on the computer screen the child has to make a choice, either to 
respond, or not to respond. In the Go-no-go condition the child has to respond 
every time two squares are presented on the screen and not respond when one 
square appears. In the Conflict condition the child is asked to respond once when 
two squares are presented and twice when one square appears. The total score for 
each task was the number of right responses to both stimuli with the maximum 
score of 32 for each task. 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST). Attentional flexibility was assessed by using 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Korkman, 1997). In this task, four stimulus cards 
are first placed on the table in front of the child. Each card has a symbol of different 
colour and shape: a red triangle, a yellow circle, a blue star and a green cross. Next, 
the experimenter takes a random card out of a set of 27 additional cards and asks 
the child to sort it on the basis of the two dimensions, colour and shape. On each 
trial the experimenter lets the child know whether a particular match is right or 
wrong and records the child’s response. After a child has had six right guesses in a 
row the experimenter changes the dimension of stimulus unbeknown to the child. 
Success on this task was rated as a total number of right guesses, with the maximum 
score of 27. 
 
Other measures 
Test of Non-Mental Representation. Following Zaitchik (1990), a test of non-mental 
representation was included in order to make sure that possible difficulties in 
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performance on false-belief tasks were due to problems specifically with mental 
representation and not representation in general. The assistant first took a photo of 
the child with a Polaroid camera and together they then watched the developing 
photograph. Next, the children were shown a toy rabbit holding a blue toothbrush. 
The assistant took a photograph of the rabbit. While the photograph was placed to 
develop face down, the assistant replaced the blue toothbrush with a white one. The 
children were then shown two photos taken beforehand, and were asked to point to 
the photo that matched the developing photograph. Control questions were then 
asked concerning the colour of the toothbrush that the rabbit had first held, and the 
colour of the toothbrush the rabbit was in reality holding now, i.e. two questions. All 
children passed the non-mental representation task. 
Non-verbal mental age.  All the children were given Raven’s matrices as a test of 
nonverbal intelligence (Raven, Raven, & Court, 2000). 
Italian Sign Language (LIS) measures. All Italian deaf children included were first 
given a test for proficiency in LIS based on the British Sign Language (BSL) 
Receptive Skills Test (Herman, Holmes, & Woll, 1999). Each of the 40 sentences in 
the original BSL test was translated into LIS and recorded on a DVD to be used as a 
test of proficiency in LIS. The translations used LIS constructions common to 
Italian signers despite regional variations. Before the test was administered, the 
children were given a vocabulary check involving signs for items (e.g. book, pencil, 
table, car). Just like the BSL test, the LIS test evaluated the understanding of 
grammatical features such as spatial verb morphology, number/distribution, 
size/shape specifiers, noun/verb distinctions, and handling of classifiers. Scores 
were given out of a maximum score of 40. Additionally, teacher ratings of children’s 
abilities in LIS were available for all 97 children. As in Peterson and Siegal’s (1999) 
study, teachers rated each child on scales of expressive language skill, 
comprehension, and vocabulary size. Ratings ranged from 1 (both “below average” 
and “inadequate for effective communication”), through 3 (“average”), up to 5 (both 
“highly competent” and “well above the average for signing children of the same 
age”). The overall score for each child was created by averaging ratings on all three 
scales. The mean score for the 97 children was 3.80  (SD = .98). The correlation 
between scores on the LIS test and the teacher ratings was .68, p < .01, providing 
evidence for validation of the LIS adaptation of the BSL test. We used LIS scores 
rather than teacher ratings as a language measure as LIS test scores provide a 
constant measure of language proficiency across schools. Children in the hearing 
control groups were tested by a native Italian speaker on an Italian version of the 
Test for the Reception of Grammar (TROG) (Bishop, 2003). 
 
Study IV 
Strange stories. The children were given eight of Happé’s (1994) 24 strange stories 
designed to test theory-of-mind on different levels. The stories involved white lie, 
lie, double bluff, appearance/reality, persuasion, sarcasm, joke, and 
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misunderstanding. Each story was read out loud while a copy of the story was 
available in front of the child to minimize memory requirements. At the end of each 
story the child was asked two test questions; a comprehension question, “Was it 
true, what X said?”, and a justification question, “Why did X say that?” Answers to 
the justification question were coded according to Happé’s (1994) modified 
procedure (R. Booth, personal communication, March 5, 2004). Two points were 
given for a complete answer with a clear indication of the story character’s mental 
states. Justifications with references to outcome or correct physical states were given 
one point. Children were given a score of zero if they gave factually incorrect or 
irrelevant answers. Since 20 of the 39 children incorrectly answered the 
comprehension question of the double bluff story, that story was excluded from 
further analyses. Three children gave incorrect answer to the comprehension 
question of the misunderstanding story. Their answers to the justification question 
of the same story were replaced with the group mean of that particular story. The 
comprehension questions of all other stories included were answered correctly by all 
children. On the strange stories the possible ToM score ranged between 0 and 14 
points. 
Peabody picture vocabulary test (PPVT-III) (Dunn & Dunn, 1997). The Swedish 
version of the PPVT-III was used to assess the children’s receptive language ability. 
The experimenter presents a word together with four pictures and the child is then 
asked to choose which of the four pictures presented depicts the word. 
Maternal accuracy task. All children, as well as both their parents and a teacher were 
asked to complete the maternal accuracy task (MAT) (Sharp, Fonagy, & Goodyer, 
2006). This was used to determine how well the caregivers could predict the 
children’s thinking in social situations. The task has been designed following the 
paradigm of maternal mind-mindedness, which refers to a mother’s inclination to treat 
her child as a psychological being – an individual with a mind, rather than a mere 
creature with needs that must be satisfied, developed by Meins and colleagues 
(2003). Meins et al. have operationalized the maternal accuracy in reading a child’s 
psychological states by evaluating it against an independent coder. As in study IV we 
interviewed older children, we could ask the children to report on the psychological 
content of their minds themselves (Sharp et al., 2006). Thus, all children were first 
presented individually with fifteen stories containing distressing social scenarios. 
These included loneliness, ridicule, being singled out, under-achievement in sport, 
having an accident, a family member having an accident, social exclusion, academic 
under-achievement, physical size, moving to a new school, physical disability, social 
embarrassment, a parent working abroad, poverty and peer rejection. The stories 
were slightly modified to fit a Swedish context. As with the theory-of-mind task, the 
stories were read out loud while a copy was placed in front of the child for 
reference. After each story children were presented with three response options: (1) 
an unrealistic and positive alternative with strong self-reference; (2) a negative 
alternative with strong self-reference; and (3) a neutral/rational/adaptive option 
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devoid of a global, internal and stable self-attribution. The same stories were then 
presented to the child’s mother, father and a teacher who knew the child well, in a 
form of a questionnaire that they were asked to fill in themselves. To assess the 
extent to which the caregivers were able to predict the attributions the children 
made, they were asked to guess which response option their child would choose for 
each scenario. The accuracy score thus equalled the number of stories on which the 
caregiver chose the same response as the child. 
 
Main results 
Study I 
The main findings of study I revealed that there were differences on the theory-of-
mind reasoning tasks between the different deaf groups as well as between the 
hearing and the deaf groups. In Experiment 1, the deaf children with 
bimodal/bilingual instruction outperformed those with oralist instruction on the 
ToM tasks, even after chronological age, nonverbal intelligence, and level of sign 
language were partialed out. There were no significant differences in ToM 
performance as shown by responses on false-belief tasks between the 
bimodal/bilingual instructed native signers and 3- to 4-year-olds as well as 5- to 6-
year-olds. However, the hearing 5- to 6-year-olds significantly outperformed the 
oralist-instructed native signers as well as the late signers, regardless of whether they 
were exposed to oralist or bilingual instruction. The hearing 7- to 8-year-olds and 9- 
to 10-year-olds outperformed all of the deaf groups. When just the youngest 
bimodal/bilingual instructed native signers (M = 82.5 months) were considered, 
they were outperformed by the hearing 5- to 6-year-olds. 
In Experiment 2, responses on the eight mentalizing tasks were scored on a 0 - 8 
point scale. The results showed that the hearing children outperformed the bilingual 
Estonian late signers, the bilingual Swedish late signers, and the oralist Estonian 
native signers. The bilingual native signers performed at the same level as the 
hearing children, but they performed better than all the other deaf groups, i.e. the 
bilingual Estonian late signers, the bilingual Swedish late signers and the oralist 
native signers. There was no difference between the bilingual late signers in Estonia 
and Sweden. We carried out an analysis of covariance to determine whether the 
differences between groups in performance on the mentalizing tasks would remain 
once chronological and mental age were partialed out as covariates. These 
differences remained significant, and planned contrasts confirmed that the hearing 
children performed significantly better than all groups of deaf children, with the 
exception of bilingually instructed native signers. 
 31
Study II 
In study II a child was considered to have an understanding of false-belief if he or 
she answered correctly both test questions of the unexpected contents task and the 
test question as well as the two control questions of the unexpected location task. 
On the false-belief tasks no significant differences were found between the 
bilingual native signers and the hearing children. The hearing children, however, 
performed significantly better than the oralist native signers. The oralist-instructed 
native signers were also outperformed by the bilingually instructed native signers. 
There were no significant differences between the bilingual late signers, the oralist 
late signers and the hearing children. 
On the digit span tasks the hearing children could recall significantly more digits 
forward than any of the deaf children. A significant group effect was also found on 
the digit span backward recall, the hearing children outperforming both the bilingual 
and the oralist late signers, but performing at the same level as both the bilingual and 
the oralist native signers. Comparisons between the bilingual and the oralist native 
signers showed that these groups performed at the same level, both on forward and 
backward digit recall. There were no differences found between the bilingual and the 
oralist late signers. 
Study III 
The hearing children performed better than the bilingual late signers, the oralist late 
signers and the oralist native signers on the theory-of-mind tasks. The bilingual 
native signers performed as well as the hearing children, but outperformed all the 
other deaf groups on the composite theory-of-mind score. 
On the Go-no-go and the Conflict task there were no significant differences in 
mean scores between any of the groups. The hearing children were outperformed by 
every deaf group on the Wisconsin card sorting task, while there were no significant 
differences between the deaf groups. There were no significant correlations between 
the theory-of-mind composite score and the different executive functioning tasks 
after the effects of the chronological and mental age were partialed out. All children 
passed the non-mental representation task. 
Study IV 
The main finding of study IV was that there was a significant correlation between 
the mothers’ accuracy scores on the maternal accuracy task and the children’s 
theory-of-mind scores. This relation remained after chronological age and PPVT-III 
scores were held constant. Thus, those mothers who were more accurate in 
predicting their children’s reasoning in distressing social situations had children who 
had higher ToM scores. Positive, but not significant, correlations were also found 
between children’s ToM scores and their father’s accuracy scores, as well as with 
their teachers’ accuracy scores. 
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To examine if children’s tendency to reason about others’ thoughts in a 
neutral/rational, negative or positive/unrealistic manner was related to maternal 
accuracy, correlations between children’s MAT answers and mothers’ MAT accuracy 
scores were calculated. There was a significant positive correlation between 
children’s neutral/rational answers and mothers’ accuracy, and a negative correlation 
between children’s positive/unrealistic answers and mothers’ accuracy. Significant 
correlations were also found between the fathers’ accuracy and children’s 
neutral/rational and negative answers respectively. There was a close-to-significant 
correlation between children’s neutral/rational answers and their teachers’ accuracy. 
Thus, children who made neutral/rational interpretations about others’ thoughts had 
parents who made more accurate predictions. 
The analyses also revealed a significant positive correlation between the 
children’s ToM scores and their neutral/rational answers on the MAT, and a 
significant negative correlation between the ToM scores and the positive/unrealistic 
answers. The negative answers were unrelated to the ToM scores. The patterns of 
significant relations remained after the effects of chronological age and PPVT-III 
scores were partialed out. 
Discussion 
A lot of research in developmental psychology has during the last 20 to 25 years 
revolved around the question of what it means to develop a theory-of-mind. Until 
recently, the main discussions have focused on the differences between ‘simulation 
theory’ and ‘theory-theory’. In a landmark paper from 1993, Gopnik argued against 
the proponents of simulation theory, suggesting that the idea of privileged first-
person knowledge of our own psychological states is just an illusion. The evidence 
suggests that when children cannot report the false beliefs of others, they are equally 
ignorant of their own previous false beliefs. The mental states of others, accordingly, 
cannot be discovered through first-person experience of the same states. Instead 
Gopnik (1993:10) concludes that “commonsense psychological beliefs are 
constructed as a way of explaining ourselves and others”, the view that has come to 
be called ‘theory-theory’. 
Both these approaches, simulation theory and theory-theory, have however been 
criticized for being too individualistic as the understanding of minds is seen as an 
individual process of introspection or formed by an individual child-theorist 
(Carpendale & Lewis, 2004). Carpendale and Lewis instead propose a constructivist 
account, which combines the social and individualistic parts of development, and 
where the understanding of others as mental agents develops through social 
interaction. They argue that children are embedded in triadic interactions taking 
place between the child, another person and the world. An understanding about the 
world as well as about the other person is constructed through the regularities that 
the children experience in these interactions. Social knowledge is thus acquired in 
action and is practical, and not based on theories that are formed to explain the 
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behaviour of other people. The ability to reflect and report on the knowledge of 
mental states develops later. According to Carpendale and Lewis, thus, to engage in 
cooperative interaction and exposure to talk about mental states are the 
cornerstones of the development of social understanding. 
The by now extensive research on early imitation is of great interest in this 
context. Already in the 1970’s it was shown how toddlers and parents interact with 
imitative behaviour (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). Later, the more complex behaviour 
of deferred imitation was shown among children around 12 months of age 
(Heimann & Meltzoff, 1996), and Meltzoff (2004) argued for imitation being part of 
the origins of theory-of-mind. Whatever the true nature of imitation, the behavioural 
data from imitation studies fit with the idea that early interaction is crucial for later 
development. Research on imitation and theory-of-mind respectively has largely 
been conducted as independent enterprises, but it is evident that core issues 
concerning the development of intentionality and an understanding of others as 
agents are common to the two different areas of research.  
Nelson (2005) has described social cognitive development in terms of “entering 
into a community of minds”. According to Nelson, to acquire a theory-of-mind is to 
understand what it means to be a human being in a human community. This 
development extends through language and involves learning to participate in a 
shared belief system. The development of one particular group of children, i.e. deaf 
children, becomes interesting in this context since they do not have access to the 
“community of minds” in the same natural way as hearing children do. Our studies, 
as well as some previous research (e.g. Peterson & Siegal, 1999; Woolfe et al., 2002), 
confirm that deaf children from hearing homes lag several years behind hearing 
children in developing mentalizing skills and that it is an advantage for deaf children 
to have deaf parents when it comes to understanding other minds. Since in the 
Estonian and the Italian cases we could recruit a group of deaf children with deaf 
parents where the children did not use sign language at school, we found that the 
advantage of having deaf parents is not independent of other factors. Deaf native 
signing children from an oralist school performed worse than deaf native signing 
children from a bilingual school on the theory-of-mind tasks. Thus, these 
differences point to the important role of education given in a native language 
environment in order to maintain the expression of mind-reading skills through 
practice.  
On the other hand, the Swedish system with very early diagnosis of deafness and 
sign language instruction immediately offered hearing parents, together with early 
sign language experience at preschool for deaf children, were not enough for the 
group of late signing children in the present thesis to be put on the same 
developmental track as deaf children of deaf parents. Something in the early 
coordination of minds and introduction to other minds seems to be different in the 
two communicative environments. In this sense, mentalizing is sensitive to specific 
kinds of early experiences. At the same time, mentalizing is resilient to even very 
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impoverished linguistic experiences. Morgan and Kegl (2006) showed that people in 
a Nicaraguan community of very late signers, after the age of ten, used mental state 
expressions in narratives, though they performed poorly at false belief tasks. 
Working memory has been suggested to contribute to the performance on 
theory-of-mind tasks (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; 
Davis & Pratt, 1995; Hala et al., 2003). To correctly answer questions about 
someone else’s false-beliefs, the children have to follow and remember the whole 
storyline. There were no significant differences between the two groups of native 
signers or between the two groups of late signers in forward or backward digit recall 
in study II, suggesting that the differences found in theory-of-mind performance are 
not attributable to any systematic differences in working memory between the deaf 
groups. 
Even though there were significant differences in theory-of-mind skills between 
the bilingual native signing deaf children on the one hand and the oralist native 
signers, the oralist late signers and the bilingual late signers on the other, there were 
no corresponding differences among the four deaf groups on the executive 
functioning skills in study III. These findings indicate that some deaf groups’ lower 
performance on theory-of-mind tasks can not be understood as difficulties with 
executive functions. 
As all deaf Estonian parents have been instructed orally at school themselves, 
and thus may be lacking a fully-fledged sign language, another signing community, 
i.e. school, could have a compensatory effect on the development of mentalizing 
skills for native signing deaf children attending a school where signing is used as 
primary mode of communication and instruction. Wood (1991) has argued that 
hearing adults, when faced with communicative problems with deaf children 
become more controlling and negative. Deaf children become over-controlled, and 
there is no space for flexible and creative discussions. Teachers in this situation also 
tend to focus more on speech accuracy and auditory awareness than on meaningful 
and contingent conversation (Singleton & Morgan, 2006). Having deaf teachers, 
who share a common language with the children, as is the case in the bilingual 
school, can accordingly provide better conditions for fluent conversations and thus 
promote the understanding of others’ mental states. 
The importance of fluent communication with a caregiver for a child’s socio-
cognitive development was demonstrated by Meins et al. (2002) who showed that 
mothers’ tendency to comment appropriately on their children’s mental states at six 
months of age was predictive of theory-of-mind performance at 48 months of age. 
This relation was independent of children’s verbal ability, mother’s education, and 
attachment security suggesting that it is specifically mother’s “mind-mindedness” 
rather than the general quality of infant-mother interaction that is important in 
developing theory-of-mind. The results in study IV show that mothers’ insight into 
the child’s mental life is related to children’s theory-of-mind reasoning even in 
middle childhood. These findings suggest that the development of mentalizing skills 
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is a gradual process, which requires constant access to talk about different mental 
states. There seems to be great flexibility and large possibilities for development and 
change, which extends long beyond early childhood years, when it comes to 
mentalizing. 
The measure used in study IV focuses on caregivers’ insight into their child’s 
social reasoning, and not on the actual communication patterns. One possible 
interpretation of our findings could be that more insight into the thoughts and 
feelings of the other family members can be a result of more family talk about 
mental states. According to Fonagy and Target (1997), and Meins et al. (2002; 2003), 
mothers’ mentalizing skills offer a “scaffolding” context where children learn to 
understand their own behaviour in terms of mental states. Thus, engaging with the 
child on a mental level provides an opportunity for the children to learn to reason 
about their own and others’ thoughts and feelings. There were no significant 
correlations between children’s theory-of-mind reasoning and teachers’ or fathers’ 
accurate predictions of the children’s thoughts in study IV. As the results are 
correlational only, there are two obvious caveats to any interpretations in terms of 
causality or direction of influence. The children of the more ‘mind-minded’ mothers 
might be more responsive and invitive in terms of joint attention and cooperation in 
general. Closely related is the possibility of a genetic factor common to mothers and 
children correlating with high mentalizing levels. The evidence concerning the 
genetic background of ToM is equivocal, however. Hughes and Cutting (1999) 
could, in a twin study, identify a high genetic component explaining variation in 
ToM. However, in a later, larger, and more diverse sample of twins (Hughes et al., 
2005) only a small fraction of variation in ToM performance could be explained by 
genetic variation. The two studies used different age groups, 42-month-olds 1999 
and 60-month-olds 2005. Hughes et al. (2005) suggested, in line with other 
researchers, the possibility that the impact of genes and environment, respectively, 
varies with age, with environmental effects being more salient at later ages. 
Altogether the results are compatible with a considerable environmental impact on 
the development of mentalizing, with language playing a crucial part, acting as a tool 
for the co-ordination of minds. 
In the case of deaf children, Meadow-Orlans and Spencer (1996) have identified 
two obstacles to the sensitive parenting of deaf children who grow up in hearing 
families: feeling inadequate in rearing a deaf child and the absence of communicative 
skills in a shared language. Among other things, hearing caregivers have been shown 
to spend less time in coordinated joint attention with their deaf children than with 
their hearing children, with the caregiver also tending to interrupt the child’s 
attention by initiating new unrelated activities. Thus, appropriately identifying and 
commenting on the child’s mental states in a “mind-minded” way seems far more 
difficult if the child and the caregiver have different hearing status. 
Our results fit with the general notion of the decisive role of language and 
communication for mentalizing. The studies presented here, however, suffer from 
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one weakness, i.e. the lack of language tests, except in the case of the Italian 
participants. More specifically, there was no test of the mastery of complement 
clauses, by some researchers suggested as decisive for the understanding of false-
belief (de Villiers, 2005; de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Schick, de Villiers, de Villiers, & 
Hoffmeister, 2007). The reason for this is that there are simply no tests available for 
Estonian Sign Language or Swedish Sign Language. Lacking such tests, it still seems 
highly unlikely that the generally low mentalizing results could be ascribed to 
language obstacles. Control questions were used in a number of cases, and they were 
answered correctly. The test of non-mental representation was also easily past. 
Equally important, the recent results from children aged between 13 months to 2 
years, indicating understanding of false-belief, cannot be explained as related to 
mastery of the complement clause, or any other linguistic construction (Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). 
If these results from very young children can be further replicated, it shows that the 
emergence of false-belief is largely independent of language, whereas, according to 
the results in this thesis, and other research, its maintenance and further 
development is dependent on specific communicative experiences, where language 
plays an integral part. Language seems to be the best tool for the coordination of 
minds in a conversational context. 
The results are also indicative of the resilience of the mentalizing skill, despite 
degraded linguistic input. As shown by the statistical measure of effect size (η2), the 
significant result, though consistently in the direction of better results the more 
native language experiences a person has been offered, the effects are sometimes at 
medium level. Irrespective of language experience, the participants in the present 
studies have mentalizing and theory-of-mind skills to a fair degree. To find really 
severe delays, and perhaps deviances, specifically in respect of false-belief, the child’s 
lack of language exposure must last for around 10 years, as indicated by recent 
findings in a Nicaraguan deaf community (Morgan & Kegl, 2006). Nevertheless, the 
results from the present studies contribute theoretically and practically. They 
strengthen the theoretical position that mentalizing and theory-of-mind is not an all-
or-none mental faculty, but a skill varying considerably in relation to communicative 
and language exposure, and at least at certain developmental stages marginally 
dependent on genetic variation (Hughes et al., 2005). At the same time, the results 
have the pedagogical implication of early and consistent introduction of relevant 
communicative and language experiences in educational settings for children who, as 
in the case of deaf children, run the risk of having few such experiences. 
In conclusion, the present work has provided evidence for the importance of 
everyday family conversations for the development of theory-of-mind reasoning. 
For deaf children the continuous access to fluent conversations in a shared language 
between the child and his or her immediate surrounding, both at home and at 
school, provides opportunities to talk about the beliefs of others and to formulate 
an understanding of how these can be false.  For hearing children, who naturally 
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share a common language with their caregivers, the relation between mothers’ 
insight into the child’s mental life and children’s theory-of-mind further emphasizes 
the role of family talk about mental states when it comes to theory-of-mind ability, 
even at the age of 8. 
A natural next step will be to empirically test the hypothesis that the early 
interaction between hearing parents and their deaf children are characterized by less 
‘mind-mindedness’ and that this is related to later lower mentalizing skills.  
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